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" 
The Education of the Public 
Man: A Medieval View 
by Judson Boyce Allen 
W H EN Odysseus comes to the court of King Alkinoos, and betrays him-self with tears on hearing the story of the Trojan horse, the king says 
to him : 
"Tell me why you should grieve so terribly 
Over the Argives and the fa ll of Troy. 
That was all god's work, weaving ruin there 
So it should make a song for men to come."· 
Again, when Lear's ruin gathers around him, he is wise enough ·to say that all 
this would be "pitiful in the meanest wretch, / Past speaking of in a king" (IV. 
vi. 208-9). The combination makes my point-the public man is the man whose 
deeds are most eminently worth remembering because he is himself important, 
and because the facts about him rise to the perfect decorum of poetry. 
This is an unusual claim to make, when the apparent needs of our culture are 
for anonymous public servants trained in the practicalities of ·management, able 
to work within more and more bureaucratically defined roles, and committed to 
the moderate optimism of technical problem-solving. High tragedy, apparently, 
should have no place. Yet at the same time public figures, in particular at both 
ends of the political spectrum, are learning, by using the power of television, that 
their influence grows precisely as they learn to behave in puplic as if they were 
characters in a fiction-dramatically, idealistically, violently, at a height of style 
which invites, and sometimes achieves, the tragic ending. In the technical realm, 
managers are learning that they sometimes deal best with their problems by dis-
tancing them to analogy with a model or a game. Charisma and efficiency seem 
seldom to occur in the same situations, or in relation to the same people, but the 
power of the image, whether it be riot or management game, is becoming 
increasingl y clear. 
If this be true, then the education of the public man needs be an education in 
the handling of images. I shall later claim that there is a hierarchy of images, and 
a variety of ways of handling them, and that both are more crucial than present 
educational theories and behavioral procedures allow us to realize. Here I shall 
simply make one more cla,im-that if the public man needs to handle images, then 
the medieval ist, by virtue of the particular piece of the past he professes and the 
particular mental procedures which knowledge of that past cultivates, is uniquely 
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qualified to advise both the public man and his teachers. To substantiate this 
claim will require not only a considerable analysis of medieval facts, but more 
important a justification of the analogical logic through which they can be made 
to apply. This analysis, and this justification, will constitute the bulk of this paper. 
First, however, something should be said of the public man himself, as he is and 
has been, and of the actual curriculum of his education. 
In his epic of the Roman Civil wars, Lucan observes at one point that "victrix 
causa de is placuit sed victa Catoni" (Bellum Civile, I, 128) , implying that the two 
opinions were of equal weight. Though Cato held public office, his influence and 
power were derived largely from the fact that, in his consummately noble way, he 
was right, and everyone knew it. Though the decisions of the powerful and the 
current of history disagreed with him, they did so guiltily, weighted by the moral 
force of his existence. Cato, then, was a public man because he was an admirable 
man; his public character was an aspect of his simple existence as a person. 
In a different era and at a different level, Jane Jacobs talks about public per· 
sonalities on whom, and on whose enterprises, the life and activity of city streets 
can focus. They are the shopkeepers, residents, or frequenters with whom one 
leaves keys or messages, on whom one depends to call the police or intervene 
themselves to prevent disorder, to whom one speaks with a sense of the recogni-
tion of home turf. They have no particular power, or virtue; they are public men 
because they happen to be literally or symbolically useful to private persons who 
frequent their neighborhood. 
In still another area, when Dante and Virgil face the barred gates of the City 
of Dis, fearful of the Furies and cringing from possible sight of Medusa, the angel 
of heaven comes "a la porta e con una verghetta ! l'aperse, che non v'ebbe alcun 
ritegno" (Inferno. IX, 89-90). At his coming the spirits before whom Dante 
quailed fled "Come Ie rane innanzi a la nimica ! biscia per l'acqua si dileguan 
tutte" (Inferno, IX, 76-77). Hell observes no law, respects no right. This angel is 
a public figure by virtue of sheer power. Here it is divine, a "bored excess of 
power"2 before which resistance simply vanishes. In a debased form, the same 
function can be found in the official who fixes tickets, or (for a fee) expedites 
contracts. It exists in the power of governors to grant pardons to criminals, or jobs 
to supporters, or dignity to an occasion. 
In this array of examples we have a definition. The public man is a person who 
is useful, powerful , and admirable, and who op~rates at both literal and symbolic 
levels. As Jacob's example proves, he may operate at low levels of the social 
hierarchy, as well as high ones, but the same characteristics apply. Though the 
public man as servant may be less absolutely powerful than a neighbor he helps, 
he does have the power, expertise, or connections to deliver what he promises. 
To put in another way, the public man is a person in society whose activity and 
personal significance are needed, effective, and right. 
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The problem with modern society is that the public figures we so often con-
front-bureaucrats, managers, politicians-are seldom effective and needed at the 
same time, almost never are they significant as personalities (except for the pol-
itician who has the facade of one), and they seem usually to be right only when 
they are ineffective or martyred. This fragmentation is, in part, the natural lot of 
a humanity which, for purposes of government, it is safest to assume fallen. But 
in our own time this fragmentation is deliberately cultivated. The very separation 
of powers at the heart of the American system of government is such a deliberate 
fragmentation. Congress responds to the needs of constituents; the executive 
branch has the power to administer the country under the law; and the courts, in 
the name of justice, decide what is right. The same fragmentation operates at 
every level of function and value. Conflict of interest laws ensure that managers 
of all sorts have no personal interest in what they manage; cost accounting sharp-
ly narrows the range of values and symbolic overtones which can be cultivated in 
a business or manufacturing process. All these arrangements seem to us so natural, 
so much a reflection of the essential givenness of things, that we can be barely 
aware of them in any critical way. Our reaction to nepotism, conflict of interest, 
judicial legislation, court-packing-to any of the multitude of possible ways people 
fail to observe the natural divisions of the world-is an automatic condemnation . 
But our condemnation, I shall argue, is more and more wrong. 
Our reaction is automatic, not because the world really is or should be divided 
as we perceive it, but rather because our normal way of seeing and thinking blinds 
us to any possible better world. We have a fundamental assumption behind our 
knowing-so far behind that we seldom realize that we assume it-which must 
be dragged up and examined and escaped, before we can make any changes that 
matter. 
This assumption is one which is given to us by the phil9sophy of Descartes. 
It is fundamental to the scientific method, and to most of our conscious judgments 
of truth. It is that subject and object are separate, and operate on one another. 
Disregarding for a moment the inevitable problem of the solipsism, which the 
common sense man of action ignores at the price of a certain distortion," we can 
see that the public man, like all men of action operating within this assumption, 
tends to be a solver of problems connected with efficient cause, because this is 
necessarily the organization under which "object" appears to him when divorced 
from "subject" in a Cartesian way. There can be no interaction between subject 
and object, no applicable universals, no symbiotic relations, no merging; the sub-
ject deals with the object either as a thing to be known, or as a thing to be manip-
ulated, or as a thing to avoid. Efficient cause is obvious in the second two ; knowl· 
edge, as our enlightened culture has developed, tends to the same end. Appeals 
to definition at some Platonic level, genus and differentiae, even the taxonomy of 
traditional biology, all seem rather old-fashioned. We know things in terms of 
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how they work, or what they do, or what place they have in a developmental or 
procedural system. 
Thus functions tend to purify. The first thing to go is the person himself. The 
public man, above all, must be disinterested. We have elaborate conflict of inter-
est laws to make sure that the public man has no private interest in what he 
does. Then there is a further classification, depending on function. We have man-
agers, bureaucrats, advisors, and politicians, that is, people who make things hap-
pen, who prevent things from happening, who understand what is happening, 
and who symbolize the public opinion of what is happening. The manager and 
the bureaucrat, thus, are natural opposites; the advisor's knowledge function 
is effective (positively or negatively) as he channels it into the description of 
purely technical processes, divorced from values ; the politician is most effective 
as a symbol of society's sense of its own virtue when he actually does nothing at 
all, that is, while he is running for office. 
The natural results follow. Industrial and clerical processes are managed with 
unparalled efficiency ; dishonesty, waste, and the innocent distortion often occur-
ing between command and execution are prevented with unparalled thorough-
ness; the political process has displaced the annual August revival as the popular 
ritual for the affirmation of virtue and the denunciation of sin (accompanied by 
all the traditional cynicisms, of course); at all levels, the application of the func-
tion of the knower-we call it "expertise"-has become so ritually important that 
consulting firms flourish to organize it. And it must be admitted that these public 
persons do actually accomplish what they claim to do, precisely that, and no more. 
The waste widely denounced in government programs is not money diverted to 
enrich a few well-connected people; rather, it is an essentially inconsistent public 
reaction to the fact that desired programs are very expens·ve. Most industrial prod-
ucts actually do work. The mail is delivered far more efficiently than it was only 
two hundred years ago. Experts do know what they are talking about, and fre-
quently predict things which actually happen. Public dissatisfaction with public 
processes is based on rising expectations. It is, after all, more acceptable to die of 
polio when it is an incurable disease than to die because the drug store happens 
to be out of Salk vaccine, even though, in absolute terms, the quality of public 
health service is better when the vaccine exists to be available for most people. 
The education of these public men-manager, bureaucrat, politician, and ad-
visor-is at present fairly haphazard. We are in a transitional period, and there-
fore not consistent. The politician, since he functions merely as the appearance of 
a man, saying appropriate things written for him by one of the other three 
(usually the advisor), may be educated any way at all-as an actor, as a lawyer, 
as a restaurant owner with a supply of axe handles, as a Rhodes scholar. The 
others tend to be people with technical training rather than liberal learning. 
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IN their very recent past there was a consistent and expected education for public 
men, best exemplified by the Oxford course in Greats, and loosely referred to 
by all of us as a lib~ral or classical education. As praised by Matthew Arnold, it 
is an "endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the 
world." As actually practiced, for the last two millennia, this education consisted 
of the study of Latin (and sometimes Greek) literature with a view to the culti-
vation of wisdom, virtue, and effectiveness in persuasion. The more humanist of 
our educationists have regretted the recent passing of this type of education, but 
even those who most· passionately wished its preservation have found themselves 
fatally vulnerable to charges of irrelevance and unprogressive thinking. For this 
irrelevance, Arnold himself calls attention to the foundation, for he calls the "en-
deavor to learn and propagate" a "disinterested" one. 
The problem with educators of the public man is that they have paid too much 
attention to curriculum, and too little to the student. It is true, broadly speaking, 
that the gross content of the educational curriculum of the upper classes (that is, 
people likely to be powerful enough to be "public") did not change drastically in 
character from Cicero to Churchill. But the student who studied this curriculum 
did change, drastically, in hisaxiOlJIs of life and mental procedure, and therefore 
in his relation to what he learned. Historical processes also intervened, to place 
the student in a certain important but unappreciated temporal relation to what he 
was learning. The contemporary of Cicero, thus, studied a literary culture which, 
in spite of its Greek roots, was essentially his own. The modern student of the 
classics studies a dead language and a- dead culture, which he can only use by 
making such imitations as the Chicago Exposition, or by placing a high value on 
the ornamental, disinterested, aesthetic, or liberal in his education. For him, 
Homer and Caesar and Cicero and Livy are the life and spirit of an alien culture 
greater than his own, which he studies for the sake of a m~ntal, personal train-
ing and a cultivation of self and character. The relation between education and 
life is as totally discontinuous as is the Cartesian relation between mind and mat-
ter. Thus educatiori cultivates the character of the public ' man. The character of 
the public man is excluded by conflict of interest laws from his public functions. 
The puhlic man operates industrial or governmental process using the specific 
skills required. Both toward his public work and his personal education, he is 
expected to be "disinterested." Relations do happen, of course, and interests are 
involved; but they are by axiomatic definition illegitimate. The medieval student, 
very different from modern man and from Cicero's contemporary, studied the 
same Latin classics we do, plus some others which were similar but in less good 
Latin and from Christian authors. But he related to them in a way radically un-
like our own, equally unlike Cicero's, and now gone rather out of fashion. He 
related to them analogically. 
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This analogical relationship is crucial, but its importance is not properly under-
stood, because we are accustomed to approach the man of the Middle Ages as an 
object of research, rather than as a possibly alternative · human being_ Thus we 
make one or both of two mistakes. The first is to be preoccupied with medieval 
deeds-with the facts of a particular war, or diplomatic mission, or procedure in 
the administration of the Exchequer. This preoccupation inevitably leads us to 
minimize differences; to believe that because wars and taxes have always been 
much the same, that the men who administered or suffered them were also much 
the same. The second preoccupation focuses on ideas, and seeks to know precisely 
what verbal formulae most neatly summarized what was thought or believed. 
Thus Simon de Montfort, in 1265, believed in Parliamentary democracy at least 
incipiently. Thus Anselm taught a particular theory of the atonement, William of 
Conches believed rather Platonic things about creation, and Dante had imperial 
notions of good government. This preoccupation with ideas or doctrines or theses 
leads us to maximize differences, usually, because we find ourselves either in dis-
agreement with these people, or unable to see why they thought the argument 
important, or both. 
What we tend to leave out of consideration is the very factor which would 
permit the example of medieval public man to be of modern value-which would 
permit the example of medieval public man to instruct his modern counterpart in 
the proper way to structure, appropriate, and use his own education-that is, the 
medieval sensibility. By this I do not mean what the man of the Middle Ages 
thought and felt; I rather mean how he thought and felt-I mean what it must 
have felt like to think medievally. When we simply repeat Dante's formula, " In 
his will is our peace," we cannot possibly mean what he meant, until we purify 
our will of Freud, our sense of God, of Santa-Claus-ism and vagueness, and our 
sense of peace of the simple and rather negative quiescence which has replaced 
the medieval sense of harmony. Again, we cannot repeat Thomist formulations 
without distortion unless we bring to them the discoverer's Aristotelian daring 
which brought them under condemnation as heresy_ In all cases, we are only true 
to the language when we allow for the sensibility_ 
I am, of course, aware of the fact that allowing for sensibility is a modern 
tendency, doubtless derived partly from relativity, and partly from phenomenology 
and other personalist philosophies. But in common sense life, this allowance is 
made only in psychological and aesthetic an'as, and in the equally remote physical 
realities of sub-atomic and inter-stellar space. I am suggesting that the allowance 
be generalized, and that the Middle Ages, which made no conscious allowance, 
can help us do it. In this respect, the Middle Ages and our own times are precise 
inverses. The Middle Ages received the past in verbal form-stories, proverbs, 
dicta, treatises-and received it by cultivating in themselves a verbal notion of 
truth not well adapted to being practical about everyday sense experience. Their 
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belief in the singleness of experience, past and present, was compensated for by a 
certain doubleness of mind. Our modern empiricism, on the other hand, is single-
minded in its attention to facts, and the facts are largely material ones. Our sens-
ibility needs a hypothetically different observer (i.e. medieval sensibility) to make 
clear that reality is not unintelligibly multiple over time, but does make a certain 
analogically structured sense. 
The doubleness of the medieval mind, ultimately, is an ability to sustain simul-
taneous belief in definition, and in the existence of an instance of that definition-
that is, it is the ability to believe that the central problem of thought and being is 
the problem of universals. This ability, which can fairly be called an analogical or 
an allegorical sensibility, involves a number of inter-acting factors . 
The first is the fact that medieval men did their work, in thought and action, 
in a language other than the one in which they had been born. Throughout the 
Middle Ages, all serious learning, speculation, communication, and description 
took place originally in Latin, or were translated immediately. Even the vernac-
ular poets, such as Dante and Chaucer, were accomplished Latinists, lovers of 
Latin books and of the auctoritas of these books. This fact is of course universally 
acknowledged, but I know of no place where its significance for sensibility has 
been adequately analysed.' 
Medieval Latin was, for all who used it, a second language, self-consciously 
learned in school and cultivated from literary models. At the same time it was a 
living language---even the insanely luxuriant mannerism of Martianus Capella 
was not slavishly rule-bound as was the sterile Latinity of the Renaissance. This 
peculiar phenomenon, a living language which has no native speakers, may well 
be a unique feature of the Middle Ages-it is certainly unique in Western civil-
ization. Because medieval man spoke two languages, he could never be like the 
average American, a chauvinist dupe of an ignorance of tongues; on the other 
hand, the Latin which medieval man trusted as the chief vehicle of his received 
and expressed truth was never quite just a human language. He could never ask 
a living person what the Latin really meant. Everything had to be learned by rule 
from books, from grammars, from the literary examples of authors long dead. 
The authors were, naturally, received as authorities, partly because they included 
examples of good Latin. Thus, whether the text were Jerome's Bible or the work 
of some antique pagan, the medieval reader faced a form of words which was, 
like its author, defined authoritatively as true before one read it, and therefore 
before any possible ratification by experience. The results of this medieval relation 
to the Latin language were two : words acquired an extraordinary authority, and 
the sense which one had of the workings of his own intellect was distanced as a 
paradoxically intimate objectivity. 
These two results may well be versions of the same thing: the reification of 
language. The intellectual enterprise of learning Latin was conscious, deliberate, 
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and bookish. It involved a good deal of careful memorization and supervised drill. 
The primers which one read as one learned were a collection of moral aphorisms, 
the Distichs of Cato, the collection of morally uplifting beast fables by Aesop 
which have not yet completely disappeared from cultural sight, and a book of 
Eclogues by Theodulus, in verse with a considerable prose gloss, which presented 
a series of pagan and Christian marvels in alternating parallel. From these books 
one progressed through a wide range of classical and post-classical literature-
Ovid, Virgil, Lucan, Cicero, Prudent ius, and others. What one got in all this 
reading was ostentatiously and relentlessly human. There were fables, poems, 
aphorisms, philosophizing, speeches, histories, in a variety of genres and styles, 
prose and verse, high style, middle and low. By and large the school books did 
not include purely technical works; one never read simply for information, but 
always submitted to and cultivated the style of humanitas. Information was in-
cluded, of course, but the encyclopedia of the seven liberal arts presented them as 
wedding guests at the Ma17iage of Mercul'Y and Philology. Therefore, when one 
learned it was by attending to the voices and deeds of radically cultivated men, 
and by learning the rules of their cultivation. Thus to think in Latin was to think 
artificially. One had to distance one's intellect and one's mental operations pre-
cisely to that distance where they could be given and living at the same time. 
Because it took place in Latin, thought took on the character of its medium, and 
became a living activity with no native actors. That is, educated people cultivated, 
naturally and necessarily, a mental life style which was constantly raising the 
individual into the condition of the typical. By distancing one's intellect, one 
could combine the sense of definition, universal and absolute, and the sense of 
instance or example or personal self. By distancing one's intellect into a linguistic 
realm which was at once given, living, and cultivatedly human, one gave one's 
private and possibly sorry existential self the freedom of thl realm of definition-
one made it not only possible but necessary that the bare forked creature man rise, 
whenever he spoke, into the condition of humanitas. 
For this medieval situation there are at least three modern analogues, which 
perhaps should be disposed of immediately, because they are so dangerously per-
verse. The first is the fictional language of Newspeak, with which Orwell so prop-
erly frightens us. The second is the real language of the government document 
and the official bulletin, which he finds also horrifying. The third is the mathe-
maticallanguage of computers and its analogues in statistics and logic. All these 
are second languages, of a sort, which are learned by rule for the doing of certain 
business, which in the way of doing that business are living enough to be altered 
in appropriate ways, and which tend to direct the thought patterns of people who 
use them extensively. Thus, like medieval Latin, they are living languages, but 
they are not and never have been learned by living infants as a primary means of 
communication. In their perverse way they also give an extraordinary authority 
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to words. But they are the opposite of the medieval man's Latin, because they are 
absolutely artificial-because they tend not to be used, as was medieval Latin, for 
love letters, poetry, and jokes; and because they are chiefly used to permit abstrac-
tions and purely structural linguistic operations to flourish without interference 
from concrete particulars and their human connotations. They are the brutalizing 
alternative which faces Cartesian, or existential, man; they are definition purified 
of humanitas. 
THE Latin culture of the medieval man, by which he distanced his intellect 
into definition without losing his self-hood in the distancing, gave an extraor-
dinary authority to words. Not only did the most technical and the most highly 
regarded medieval processes (such as theology and politics) tend to be verbal; even 
more, the corpus of known truth tended to be contained in a relatively small but 
varied collection of books defined as authoritative. The resultant sensibility was 
not well adapted, as I have said, to the efficient handling of concrete experience. 
What it could do to perfection was to harmonize apparently conflicting authori-
ties. What it learned from doing so was an analogical or allegorical habit of mind. 
The truth, by definition, was single, simple, and Christian. The received cor-
pus of true authorities, on the other hand, was as varied as classical and Christian 
culture. Abelard's Sic et Non, a rigorous and simplistic demand that we line up 
our authorities and then decide which among them are wrong, has made him a 
hero in certain philosophical eyes, but his warmly doubleminded attempt to love 
God and Eloise at the same time is more medieval. Perhaps if he had been single-
bodied about the flesh, and double-minded about theology, Bernard would have 
liked him better. But however complex the reasons, the Middle Ages rejected 
Abelard, and canonized Bernard, and the decision was an affirmation of Both-
And, a rejection of the Either-Or. , 
The corpus of received truth \lvas a collection of books-the most widespread 
medieval literary genre was therefore the commentary. Glosses dealt both with 
the words and with the men and events to which the words referred; difficulties 
were sometimes simply verbal, and sometimes more serious. Always the effort was 
to harmonization, to reconciliation, to making it possible ~or all the various things 
in the inheritance to be true, and at the same time to say the truth which, under 
God, everyone knew was central and essential. 
Sometimes the difficulties are relatively small. The great ninth meter of Boe-
thius' Consolation of Philosophy book III, for instance, is a thoroughly Platonic 
poem in praise of God and God's orderliness in creation. William of Conches' 
commentary is one of the most important and elaborate; in his careful dealing 
with even minor problems we can see how thorough was the medieval concern 
to save the truth of the received text. For instance, William is at great pains to 
understand precisely why Boethius uses the word "perpetua" instead of the word 
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"eterna" to describe God's governing reason, or how one could say of God's rela-
tion to the world, "das cuncti moveri," when obviously the stable earth does not 
move_ The first problem William solves by explaining that though the reason is 
indeed eternal with respect to God, it is only perpetual with respect to the world 
being governed, because the world has a beginning. The second problem he 
solves by an appeal to Aristotle's six kinds of motion: "generatio, corruptio, aug-
mentum, diminutio, alteratio, secundum locum mutatio." Obviously, all things 
created move in at least one of these ways. Here, William solves his problems by 
making careful distinctions among literal meanings; his attention is concentrated 
on the words and what they say, and on the necessity of showing the precise pos-
sibilities which permit them to be true. ' 
Problems involving more serious contradiction the Middle Ages solves by the 
use of allegory, a procedure wholly arbitrary and alien to the Cartesian sensibility, 
which misunderstands it as a rationalist game. The sensibility of the Middle Ages 
compels me to use the term, but at the same time compels me to insist on a rather 
different definition for it than the literary, rhetorical, and symbolist ones.6 Allegory, 
as I mean the term here, refers to that habit of mind which deals with being by 
arranging it in ordered parallels. Thus the Old Testament is parallel to the New; 
holy history is parallel to-that is, allegorical of-the life of Christ, the moral life 
of man, and the life of heaven to come. These are the inevitable four levels: 
Littera gesta docet, quod credas, allegoria 
Quod agas, tropologia, quo tendas, anagogia. 
The same procedure can be used to reconcile apparent contradictions. Anything 
in the Bible which does not literally teach charity must do so allegorically, and 
one can see this fact by putting the literal story in parallel to some schema of 
charity, and developing a large number of one-to-one relationships. By this pro-
cedure, one could find unity of doctrine throughout the whole range of inherited 
culture. Allegorizations of Ovid's Metamorphoses prove that even the most licen-
tious tales could be assimilated in this manner. 
All this is the common knowledge of medievalists. But it needs one final added 
twist. One of the levels was tropology-"quod agas," what one must do. The same 
procedure of allegorization which reconciled apparent contradictions in the inher-
ited corpus of authoritative words also related the individual, in his own behavior 
and sense of himself, to that corpus. History exists as a great array of moral exam-
ples, to which one must put oneself as a parallel. Past and present, history and 
person, relate to one another not as cause and effect, but as allegory and allegory, 
as model and example. 
Summarizing then: the sensibility of the educated medieval man was based on 
a Latin which distanced his ego into definition, which provided him with a highly 
cultivated and poeticized corpus of literature as the container of his received truth, 
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and which encouraged allegory as the dominant' mental procedure for dealing 
with interior and exterior reality. Not all medieval men, of course, were so culti· 
vated, but public men as a rule were. If they were not educated, they were kings 
and nobles, whose sacramental existence and daily contact with educated assistants 
gave them much the same sensibility. 
THE actual educational process which produced this sort of medieval public 
man has been most charmingly described by John of Salisbury, in his Meta· 
logicon.7 He gives us ' full details. Bernard of Chartres, "the greatest fount of lit· 
erary learning in Gaul," taught by reading literature to his students, explaining 
rules of grammar and style, helping his students to imitate what they heard and 
memorize choice portions daily. In all their work, students were encouraged in 
decorous speech, religious devotion, and moral behavior. The elegance, grace, and 
point of John's description, and indeed of all his works, is testimony to the quality 
of Bernard's teaching, and John's distinguished public career is testimony to its 
pragmatic value. Certain features of this marvelous educational program need 
emphasis here, both because they are important to my argument, and because they 
have all fallen thoroughly out of favor with contemporary educationists. In the 
first place, the teaching was personal. The students had come to Chartres specific. 
ally to work under Bernard-the medieval habit of following teachers from place 
to place is notable. Second, the teaching emphasized the rules of expression, and 
at the same time the imitation of elegant examples of their use. Third, the stu· 
dents were encouraged to memorize. Fourth, the object of it all, clearly, was to 
make the student a good person-religiously, morally, and practically. 
Only as a supplement to this program does logic have its use. John studied 
logic under Abelard and others in Paris, and soon grew most conceited with his 
skill a'nd knowledge. When he came to his senses, he wen~ to study under the 
William whose commentary on Boethius was referred to earlier. Eventually, after 
twelve years of various studies, he returned for a visit to the logicians of Paris and 
found that they had made no progress in the interim, and were still arguing the 
same old questions, ' but with less perspective and restraint than before. John con· 
cludes that "just as dialectic expedites other studies, so, if left alone by itself, it 
lies powerless and sterile. For if it is to fecundate the soul to bear the fruits of 
philosophy, logic must conceive from an external source." The external source, of 
course, is the received body of human experience, as preserved in the books of 
the past.8 
For the reintroduction of this program of teaching and learning, quite literally, 
into the schools of our own day, Dorothy Sayers argues most persuasively. She 
claims quite properly that a curriculum of "subjects" leaves students with a store 
of information useful in the contexts for which they were taught, but without the 
tools for proceeding to learn further on their own, and utterly at the mercy of 
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propagandists and well-meaning idiots, however learned, who abuse language_ 
She therefore recommends grammar, logic, and rhetoric as tool subjects, and 
relates them to natural stages in the learning process of the child_ These are, in 
her terms, the "Poll-parrot" stages of memorization and assimilation, the "pert" 
stage of the objectionable and argumentative older child, and the "Poetic" or crea-
tive and self-expressive stages of'the younger teen-ageL9 Something like the same 
three stages are presented, with more ponderous academic rigor and considerably 
less style, by Alfred North Whitehead in The Aims of Education_ 
Both as a medievalist and as a human being who wishes well for education, I 
incline' to agree with Miss Sayers, and yet I think, for the education of the public 
man, her program would succeed indirectly and accidentally rather than because 
of what it centrally proposed to do and be_ Grammar, logic, and rhetoric are the 
crucial tools of learning only if the crucial problems to be solved by learning are 
verbal ones; it is accidental to the schema, but essential to the result that Miss 
Sayers (and I) have in mind that the verbal problems this education actually 
worked on were problems involving nobility and high decorum_ Grammar 
brought with it great literature, and rhetoric presented the rules of its technical 
greatness, while logic was chiefly exercised on metaphysics and on the implica-
tions of God_ The result that mattered, both for the Middle Ages and for our use 
of their experience, was the human being heightened into definition and accus-
tomed to thinking allegorically_ 
It is a fact of intellect that a culture eventually gets all the consequences of its 
axioms, and not just the ones it expected on assuming them_ Thus modern man 
must take the solipsism, material determinism, and the positivist denial of ques-
tions of value along with sharpened senses and their resultant technology, indi-
vidualism, and democracy. As our Cartesian culture has become more clearly 
conscious of all these consequences, the axioms become less attractive, and prob-
lems appear with which the axiom system is not qualified to deal. We have, for 
instance, a problem with the relation between person and structure-people who 
wish to be humanists seem driven to be anarchist, and people who willingly 
assume roles in large organizations are thought in existential bad faith. We have 
a problem with the evaluation of means-technically, whatever can be done, it 
seems, will be done, and the energies of society will be channelled into fields, such 
as engineering, in which doing leads exponentially into more doing. We have a 
problem with hierarchies; if all men are created equal, then hierarchies are im-
moral, and yet Sweden and England are finding that actual equalization is a low 
and frustrating barbarism which pleases neither the equalized up nor the equal-
ized down. Cartesian individualism has located human value in the private sphere, 
forgetting that an earlier age could have used the phrase "homo privatus" for 
someone in jail. The resulting value of private time, defined as not·work, has lead 
to a capital-intensive economy in which most work is inhuman . 
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The verbalism of the Middle Ages, on the other hand, solved the problem of 
human roles, was able to humanise hierarchy by making it sacramental, and 
assimilated whatever technical process happened to be discovered into the human. 
But the Middle Ages was never able to deal with money at a sufficiently high 
level of abstraction, doubtless because the general tendency to reify universals 
(even Nominalists and skeptics were more realist than we are) led to a com· 
modity theory of money. There was neither feudal nor sacramental place for the 
middle class-for free city people attached to no lord and no land. In the end, it 
was probably printing that blew the Middle Ages apart, by presenting a verbal 
culture with such a flood of words, accurately multiplied, titled, and indexed, 
that the allegories of meditative reconciliation could no longer assimilate them 
all into coherence. 
We are never fully conscious of our axioms until it is too late. At the same 
time, becoming thus conscious of axioms and their array of good and bad con· 
sequences is a good sign that new ones are on the way, of which we will once 
again not be fully conscious until it is too late. Nevertheless we must try, both by 
looking for our new axioms, and 'by behaving in ways which deny our worn out 
ones, to see what we can discover. The problems which we face-the problem of 
structures and roles, the problem of means, the problem of hierarchy-are all 
problems of understanding and personhood and value. None of them is techno-
logical; none of them demands primarily an expert in efficient causes. The public 
man who solves them-indeed, the public man who is,disposed even to work on 
them-must be a very different sort from the person we now most often produce. 
I said at the outset that the public man should be a person who is needed, 
effective, and right ; whose life and deeds rise to the decorum of poetry; and 
whose knowledge of what to do and be is likely to be based on his ability to 
handle images. It may well be that such a person, in a mor or less accidental 
way, would run an efficient office, carry out a public works program with effic-
iency and dispatch, or see to it that dependent children were no more lavishly 
supported than the law allows. He might even be marginally interested in such 
things. But only as they were means to something else. Thus defined, his primary 
energy would be spent on understanding, on interpretation, and on simply trying 
to exist as a person in the correct fashion . Acting in this way, he would tend to 
solve the problems I have just outlined, and would, if he succeeded, exist as the 
incarnation of their solution. 
I shall not argue that these problems are important. If it is self-evident that 
they are, then it follows that the culture is turning a corner into a new identity, 
under new axioms, and needs this new kind of public man. If it is not self·evident 
that they are, then the present progress towards Jacques Ellul's Technological 
Man will continue. Hitherto the rise and fall of philosophies and cultures implies 




confidence in simply presuming that our present absurdities will not grow much 
more monstrous, and that the various counter cultures are the incipient begin-
nings of what is struggling to be born_ 
ASSUMING that the new public man is needed, how is he to be educated? The 
medieval experience is here most instructive. We should not want, nor are 
we able, to restore the supremacy of the medieval verbal axioms; we should not 
want to repeat their failures with printed word, with middle class, with science 
and technolvgy (though this condemnation is overdone, and really unworthy of 
our civilization of engineers and tinkerers whose theology, after all, is in rather 
parlous state). But the Middle Ages did solve, or in Latin were given the solution 
of, the problem of the relation of man to his defining role. The Middle Ages did 
manage to develop a social structure which was efficiently hierarchial and at the 
same time human. The Middle Ages did make such technology as it had the serv-
ant of man, rather man the servant of it-the cathedrals were no mean feats of 
engineering, but they also allowed scope for individual craftsmen's eccentricities, 
and they were ultimately not engineering but incarnate theology. Finally, the 
Middle Ages made a more successful use of the past-of history-than any other 
culture I know. Our solutions to these problems will not be medieval, but our 
solutions will be more successful if they are fostered by analogy to the medieval 
solutions. The education of our public man, then, needs to be an education in 
analogical thinking. 
As I indicated at the outset, this analogical thinking is already being used most 
successfully by the riotous manipulators of television images, by advertising, and 
by researchers and technicians who use models and games. Our problem is simply 
to find ways of learning and teaching which will encourage this analogical think-
ing to come to human, rather than perverse or simply technical, results. 
Modern images and models tend to be of three kinds, television images, adver-
tising images, and models. Through television, people transform themselves into 
images of themselves, preferably at some moment which the audience will accept 
as a moment of truth. There is analogy, but it is the analogy of identity in trans-
lation. Through advertising, people transfer values from one to the other of 
totally disparate images. The connection between sex and cigarettes could prob-
ably be explained by a psychiatrist, but it is only the willingness to ignore that 
connection which makes it possible to sell the one with pictures implying the 
other. Through model-m:lking and gaming, people project wholly or largely arti-
ficial analogies into parallel with their problems, hoping for insight. Thus, the 
first analogy is an analogy without a difference; the second an analogy with an 
infinite difference; and the third is an analogy with only one real term. Medieval 
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allegories, on the other hand, tended (except in cases of pure verbal wit) to relate 
systematically and in detail two entities which were different, but not utterly dif· 
ferent, both of which were historical or reaL Moreover, the terms of medieval 
allegory tended to be given in words, though pictures and rituals derived from 
these words were also popular. The medieval procedure required the maker of 
analogies to confront something that was real and in some way culturally remote; 
while modern procedure makes it possible to be entirely artificial, and to stay com· 
pletely within one's own culture. When artificial, the analogy is likely to lead to 
insights which are inhuman; when completely within one's own culture, it is not 
likely to lead to radical insights at alL 
History, to the medieval man, was the ordered space on which God's providence 
was displayed. Though most of its content was culturally remote, coming from 
biblical and classical times, and though that part of history which was medieval 
tended to be preserved in words which assimilated it into the classical-biblical 
milieu, medieval men were not disposed to recognize the cultural remoteness of 
history. They were untroubled by anachronism, and read all history as equally 
familiar. At the same time they read it in the inherited words, and so received it 
as at once close and distanced; at once as near as yesterday, and as far away as 
languages of auctoritas in which it came. We can no longer read history in this 
way; archeology, anthropology, and the critical methods of scholarship have made 
us irretrievably aware of anachronism. But by combining this positivist knowledge 
of historical fact with a sensitivity to sensibility as well, we can relate to the past, 
as I have said, with a singleness in doubleness which is quite closely analogous to 
the medieval relation. 
Since we can, we will. This is the psychic version of the technological tyrrany 
of means-if it can be done, it will. What the modern public man needs, more 
than anyone thing, as the core and basis of his education, is history-that is, the 
collected stories of the exemplary actions of men to which he can relate himself 
analogically, and whose stories he can use as analogical models for the solution of 
his own problems of meaning and means. What the young are demanding and 
cultivating, since positivists and scientists and academics own history and insist 
that facts are more important than history, is a whole range of alternative his· 
tories, all of them imaginary, which function in the way that history should. 
Hallucinatory experiences, science fiction, such fantasy as Tolkien's, some funda· 
mentalist religion, black culture, are all ways of putting oneself into experimental 
parallel with a mode of human existence which is somehow alien and possible at 
the same time. Perhaps, in the end, these sources of analogy will be enough. But 
I would feel safer with Heinlein if I could have history as well. 
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IN very practical and concrete terms, the education of the public man should 
include the following elements. First, he should gain a thorough knowledge 
of at least two cultures other than his own, one contemporary, one long dead. By 
other than his own, I mean far enough distant to be based on entirely different 
axioms. Contemporary cultures now would have to be oriental or primitive; soon 
the global village might make genuinely different ones extinct. For culture of the 
past, any era would do before the Renaissance. Obviously, because the human ele-
ment in this education would be all-important, and because man is the animal 
which talks, learning these two cultures would include gaining fluency in their 
languages. Second, he should serve an on-the-job apprenticeship to some public 
figure capable of being for him a teacher, a model, and a patron, combining func-
tional and human significance. Third, he should be encouraged to cultivate in 
himself what already seems to be of growing importance in our values and 
thought patterns, that is, the ability to use analogies in order to gain insight. If 
he does this, he will necessarily deal with his analogy cultures as if they were 
literature, and will prize most highly from them their literary remains. Answer-
ingly, he will tend to behave, and to relate to people, in ways capable of being 
taken as parallel to a literary existence. Almost regardless of the disposition of the 
public figure under whom he works, this kind of student will learn from him the 
same sorts of things he has accustomed himself to learning from his books and 
his field studies; if the relationship survives, it will be forced to become more 
personal and symbolic, less purely functiona1. 1 0 
One final point needs to be made about the education of this model public 
man. The piece of the past which he will probably choose to study, if not put off 
by the wrong kind of historian operating the wrong kind of fact-grubbing school, 
will likely be the Middle Ages, or something remarkably similar. I say this 
beca use the general practice of cultures is to move forw~rd by standing on the 
piece of the past just before the one which preceeded them, and because the atti-
tudes of the rising generation toward technology, toward the self, and toward 
structures of reasoning I call allegorical, are strikingly analogous to medieval ones. 
The culture's use of the past, until recently, has involved skipping the Middle 
Ages (even the na~e betrays our established attitude-the medieval period was 
between two important ages). As the extending culture of the Renaissance, we 
stood on classical Greece and Rome. There was an abortive attempt to move for-
ward in the nineteenth century, but it was overwhelmed by the progressive power 
of railway executives whose buildings--Old Euston Station in London and Penn 
and Grand Central in New York-rivalled the Roman baths in classical and im-
perial splendor. Two of these three are no more, and the third has been given a 
Brobdignagian insult; the step is about to be taken. When the Enlightenment 
finally dies, we shall reach for our next future standing in the Middle Ages. As 
for the force of the analogy-that contemplating the Middle Ages helps one to 
186 
EDUCATION OF THE PUBLIC MAN 
understand the attitudes and problems beginning to surface In contemporary 
culture-it must work by insight or it will not work at all. It has by now seemed 
self-evident to a number of people. 
It is at least clear to all of us that something is going on, that the center will 
not hold, that there is a smell of apocalypse in the air, and there are still some, I 
am sure, who weep for the loss of the certainties of 1910, and the loss of the lives 
of Dresden. But the real tragedy is not mortality, not even the mortality of fire. 
That is universal, and we shall not change it. The real tragedy is not even that 
Vonnegut is no Homer, and Dresden no Troy. Not only have we no Alkinoos to 
offer consolation; we have the worse guilt of knowing that our stories probably 
aren't worth telling, because we have lived not with the heart but with the glands. 
When Faulkner said this, he pointed to man 's talking as the least of our consola-
tions, beyond which was his soul, a spirit capable of the high abstractions. I 
should like to believe that the time will soon ~ome that spirits capable of the 
high abstractions will be found, not only in novels, but also in every area of 
public life. Then history, an enterprise requiring the collaboration of providence, 
people, and written memory, may once again be 
... god's work, weaving ruin there 
So it should make a song for men to come. 
NOTES 
'The Odyssey, tr. Robert Fitzgerald· (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963), p . .\42, 
21 am grateful for this telling phrase to my colleague, Sr. Paton Ryan. Such boredom, confront-
ing Medusa's Hell, is a reminder of the true dimension of omnipotence. 
BOne may deny the solipsism, on the basis of a set of axioms which do not include be imply it; 
but to' ignore it, assuming the empirical axioms which do imply it , is~ to put ones' self at the 
mercy of material isms more mechanical than is good for humanity. Since no axiom is a priori 
privileged, prudence suggests avoiding those with perverse or inhuman consequences. 
4Erich Auerbach comes closest, in his Literary Language and its Public in Late Latin Antiquity 
and in the Middle Ages, and in the monumental Mimesis, but his analyses of style and the 
meaning of style relate more to doctr'ine than to the sensibility of the one who holds the 
doctrine. According to R. Dragonetti, "Aux frontieres du langage poetique: la conception du 
langage poetique dans Ie 'De vulgari e1oquentia' de Dante," Romanica gandensia, 9 (1961), 
9-77, Dante defines the literary Italian which he wishes to cultivate in a way which leads to 
much the same effect as my definition of Latin as a living language without native speakers. 
But Dante treats the native speakers differently. 
5The commentary has never been edited . These excerpts are printed by]. M. Parent, a .p., in 
La doctrine de la creation dans Ncole de Chartres (Paris, Ottawa, 1938), pp. 124 If, 
6Within the frame of reference of literary criticism, I deal with these matters of definition at 
some length in The Friar as Critic (Nashville, 197 1) . Here there is only room for dogmatism: 
Angus Fletcher, in Allegory, tl;e Theor)!. of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca, 1964), is misled by the 
fact that allegory leads to interpretations to claim that its essential feature is reference; C. S. 
Lewis, in The Allegory of Love (Oxford, 1953) , is dominated by Coleridgean theories of poetry 
and by the famous distinction between fancy and the imagination i he relegates allegory to the 
area of verbal trickery or ornament, Michael Murrin, in Veil of Allegory (Chicago, 1969), dis-
cusses the relation of allegory to obscurity and to prophecy; his analysis seems to me true and 
important, but does not focus on matters useful to my argument here. In the sense in which I 
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use the term, allegory is a generalized version of the biblical typology which Jean Danielou 
defines in From Shadows to Reality: Studies in tile Biblical T ypology of the Fathers, tf. Wulstan 
Hibbard, (Westminister, Md., 1960). 
71t can be argued that what John describes is not typical, but is rather the best educatio n the 
Middle Ages achieved, and that at the height of its twelfth century renaissance, before there 
descended upon western Europe the logic-choppi ng darkness of scholastic barbarism. This is in 
a manner true, and the modern fascination of philosophy for linguistic analysis has analogously 
deprived learning of a center at once rigorous and human . At the same time, Curtius' hostility 
to scholasticism may well be overstated . The literary culture of Dante and Chaucer, not to 
mention such dist inctly minor professional academics as Robert H olkot and Nicholas Trevet, is 
proof that one could still get a reasonably good grammatical education after 1200. 
8[ohannis Saresberiensis Episcopi Camotensis Metaiogicon Libri Ill, ed. C. C. I. Webb (Oxford, 
1929), I. 24, pp. 53-58. 
'''The Lost Tools of Learning," in The Poetry of Search and the Poetry of Statement (London, 
1963), pp. 155-176. 
lOIt is interesting to note in this connection that John of Salisbury was apparently unable to con-
ceive of a governmental abstraction without a person in it. Hans Liebeschiitz notes this fact 
twice: "One of the peculiarities of John's political thought [is that he] avoids any idea of a 
corporation as the executant of political action. In John's mind the State consists simply of the 
actions of the officials w ho command in the ruler's name, and the actio ns of the subjects who 
react to these commands." Medieval Hum anism in the Life and W ritings of ' olin oj Salisbury 
(London, 1950), p. 82; d. p. 6. In genera l terms, one could say that the content of the ab-
straction was a person. But one should go on to say that the relation between person and 
abstraction is reciprocal-the government is person, but the person is an anointed king, who is 
usually at some pains to look royaL Modern British useage preserves this precise point, by 
insisting on the plural verb for collective nouns : "The government are." 
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